CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and Non Proliferation
- Assessing the threats on Europe
- Ballistic missiles
- Nuclear weapons
- Chemical and biological weapons
- How does the EU present the threats ?
- Creating and using CFSP tools
- The choice of the strategy
- The actions of the CFSP
Since the end of the Cold War, the nature and origins of threats on Europe have changed. This evolution of repartition of powers in the world led some countries to develop their defence and military capabilities, whether it concerns missiles, biological or chemical weapons, or the ultimate military achievement, nuclear weapons. These countries are considered proliferant, although the definition of proliferation remains different from one country to another. We consider in this paper, that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consists in the acquisition of ballistic missiles (by purchasing or developing them), the establishment of nuclear programmes for military purposes, and the development of biological and chemical weapons. To what extent is European Union concerned? What are the tools at the disposal of the EU, and especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? The territorial security, and specially, when it comes to military matters, is primarily a state concern. But in the European Union, member states have pooled their powers and concerns, which allow not only common actions but also common worries.
[...] After a Common Position of the Council of Ministers on universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in November, a major step was finally taken in December 2003, not only for non proliferation policy, but also for the CFSP in general : the adoption of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD which is both a culmination and the start of a cohesive strategy, and the adoption of the European Security Strategy The strategy on WMD has three chapters : one assessing the threats, the second prescribing a multilaterist response, and the last one giving all instruments that must be used, among which developing the necessary structures within the Union Indeed a strategy is nothing without concrete measures. [...]
[...] Second, the EU, which relies on multi- This arms embargo on China was imposed after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, and will be abolished only when China moves toward EU human rights norms EU-US Summit Declaration on enhancing cooperation in the field of non proliferation and the fight against terrorism, Joint Programme of work on the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, June lateral agreements, has difficulties to deal with the Iranian claim of the inalienable right of any state to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes Today according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran possesses all the technologies required to develop nuclear weapons, despite all EU efforts of negotiations, the sanctions imposed by the United Nations since December 2006 and the Resolution 1747 adopted by the Security Council last 24 March. [...]
[...] These partially direct and strongly indirect threats are important because, as it shall be explained below, the EU has a preference for non military means, and favors its economic and political tools Nuclear weapons States that embark on a nuclear programme, without being part of the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT, signed in 1968), are considered proliferant. DPRK and Iran are pointed at all over the world. But for the EU, Asia is only an area of insterest, whereas Iran is a more direct threat in case it really develops nuclear energy on military purposes. [...]