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Delusions of Soviet power and the American military-industrial complex

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  1. Introduction.
    1. The Cold War period for the United States.
    2. Soviet Union versus the United States.
  2. The culture that harbored anti-communism and a deep seeded fear of not only Soviet military dominance.
  3. United States - well suited during the Cold War.
  4. Intentionally embellishing and exaggerating the threat.
  5. The Reagan administration - anti-Soviet discourse.
  6. Conclusion.

The Cold War period for the United States and indeed, the world was one of turbulence and uncertainty. The conclusion of World War II saw the clash of two major world powers, each replete with the awesome capability of nuclear weapons. For the first time in history the human race intentionally developed and produced the means to its own destruction. It was the Soviet Union versus the United States, communist doctrine against democratic capitalism. World War II had, without an iota of doubt, awoken a ?sleeping giant,? that spawned the early constructs of the contemporary military-industrial complex. Mills best describes this complex in his work, The Power Elite. He asserts that, ?American capitalism is now in considerable part a military capitalism, and the most important relation to the big corporation to the state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs.? In essence, the military-industrial complex, hereafter referred to as MIC, is the collusion between private corporations and the State military for financial benefit. War can prove exceedingly profitable for those in certain positions, and the Cold War was no exception.

[...] nation's policy makers and military strategists stalked and feared an elusive predator based on suggestion and autosuggestion, the blurring of fact and fiction, and the projection of collective fears and desires.?[9] Uncertainty and disillusionment plagued American attitudes toward the Soviet predator. Regular citizens and policy makers were crippled by a lack of knowledge of the enemy that they feared for reasons that were superficially easily comprehended, but were vacuous in nature. Reasons or evidence that supposedly proved empirically that communism posed an imminent danger to democracy and assuaged the knowledge deficit relied on defective information. [...]

[...] Empirical evidence proving that the government elites harbored trepidation regarding the Soviet Union is difficult to procure (Ungar, Sheldon 1990, p.172), in fact, ?they were aware of the need to their solution to the Soviet threat .However, the elite's awareness of the need to sell the threat in order to gain political leverage for a particular solution does not mean that the elite was immune to the fear that Sanders admits gripped the public.?[20] Despite this, it is rather difficult to refute the overwhelming evidence suggesting that certain organizations in the government and in private industry disregarded intelligence deficiencies so that they could engender in the American people fear. [...]

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