Comparative Religion, cognitive peers
- Comparative Religion
- Cognitive peers
A cognitive peer, as defined by Tom Kelly refer to a person who posses all the intellectual virtues as the other peer. It also refers to the person who has been exposed to the same arguments as the other peer (Kelly, 2005; p.175). Kelly stated that the only question at issue is whether arguments with once known peers would inevitably undermine the rationality of justification of one's beliefs. This might require that if the arguments do not undermine the level of confidence in maintaining one's belief, then the level of confidence lowered must be compatible with rational maintaining of the belief. The rationality of the peers engaged in disagreement depends on the peer who has correctly evaluated evidence to his disagreement (Kelly, 2005; p.180).
People probably have had many acquaintances and possibly close friends having beliefs that significantly differ from their own. In some cases, the differences in beliefs can be commonplace, such that one's belief can be that LA Lakers are the best NBA team and a friend may belief that Dallas Mavericks or Chicago Bulls are the best NBA team. Despite the differences, friends will still manage to go along and remain friends.
[...] (Print) Translated by Marion Kuntz. Princeton: Princeton University press Clark, Kelly James. Return to Reason. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.Feldman, Richard. Reasonable Religious. Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Edited by Louise Antony. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press Pp. 194-214. Hetherington, Stephen Cade. [...]
[...] However; it is a rare occasion for both to be fully rational on the particular disagreement. In the philosophy, it is concluded that one of the epistemic peers is not fully rational as they do not have same evidences despite contrary appearances. Often, disagreements in philosophy have at least one epistemic peer not being fully rational and probably both the peers are misled by subtle equivocations, and that at least one of the epistemic peers is irrational on the occasion in his evidential assessment. [...]
[...] Wrapping up the essay, it is wise to state that disagreement over religious beliefs in many instances does affect one's confidence of justification and significantly lower one's religious belief. However, this does not undermine the significant religious beliefs. In certain circumstances, as argued in the essay, Christians are justified to hold their beliefs when faced with disagreement. However, there are no considerations showing that Christians always remain justified in holding to their beliefs when confronted with disagreement. Bibliography Bodin, Jean, and Ludwig Noack. Colloquium heptaplomeres de rerum sublimium arcane abditis. Suerini Megaloburgiensium: F.G. Baerensprung, . [...]
[...] Many people find religious disagreement problems compelling in different forms. This seems to be the reasons that Jean Bodin claimed that each religion is refuted by all (Bodin, 1975; p.256). Richard Feldman argued that religious beliefs disagreements imply that those disagreeing are not rationally justified to believe that someone's religious belief is true (Feldman, 2007). In the above example, the arguments presented are valid, meaning that the argument structure is such that the conclusions cannot be wrong if the grounds are correct. [...]