Through this research, one can define the concepts and theories of management results in the first chapter. In the second chapter, it will address the impact of governance mechanisms on the management statement.
Finally, it will address this problem through an empirical study in the Tunisian context by focusing on the following topics: 1 - The degree of flexibility and standardization of Tunisian creative accounting 2 - Does the choice of accounting methods and conventions serve as an instrument of management result by the Tunisian leader? 3 - The role of control mechanisms and institutional management in limiting income management. This will administer a questionnaire to a sample of accountants to empirically validate the research hypotheses.
Since the wave of financial scandals that hit U.S. stock markets and the collapse of prestigious companies that were the pride of American managerial system, the attention of politicians and academics was turned to the study of the phenomenon of management result.
The concept of \"management result\" is at the heart of the debate in corporate governance because the result of these accounting scandals now lives a real crisis of legitimacy. In this regard, an infinite number of studies have been addressed with the overriding concern is to improve the quality of accounting information to publish financial reporting quality.
Thus the first attempts have focused on managing results. The results are defined earning management as \"a deliberate intervention in directing the process of presenting financial information in order to capture personal gain. \"
In order to define the crisis of investor confidence following there cent cases (Enron, World Com, Vivendi, Batam), The United States, France, Tunisia engage in institutional and legal reforms.
Indeed, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley is to improve the reliability of financial statements by the provisions that seek primarily to increase the liability of directors and to strengthen the independence of auditors as well in France and Tunisia by laws on financial security.
From a conceptual point of view, the concept of performance management is still a very interesting topic that growing interest.This concept holds that interest to the scene of the current U.S. Studies show that the level of U.S. firms, the manipulation of accounting results has become a commonly accepted practice.
Starting from such a situation, the existing literature has identifiedseveral definitions of earnings management, among which we can look to that reported that \"managing for results is a distortion in the application of generally accepted accounting principles but the application of principles fundamentally failed \".
Indeed, results management occurs when managers use their discretionary latitude in the process of financial accounting and structuring transactions to alter financial statements or to mislead some stakeholders on the economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual issues that rely on accounting numbers.
As explained the accounting choices made by managers can have a significant impact on the quality of the information content and influence subsequent decisions of stakeholders.
The term \"accounting choice\" is defined as any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (in form and substance) the reports produced by the accounting system, including financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, tax returns or other documents to be filed by regulation.
Tags: an empirical study in the Tunisian context; governance and management of income.
[...] Finally, we will address this issue through an empirical study in the Tunisian context, focusing on the following topics: The degree of flexibility and standardization in Tunisian creative accounting 2 The choice of accounting methods and management tool- a statement by the leader of Tunisia 3The role of control mechanisms and institutional management in limiting income management We will administer a questionnaire to a sample of accountants to empirically validate the research hypotheses. Chapter Review of the management theory of profit Introduction The wave of financial scandals hit U.S. [...]
[...] We have proposed through an empirical study in the Tunisian context to study first, the degree of flexibility and standardization: Tunisian creative accounting. Secondly, the choice of accounting conventions acts as an instrument of management by Tunisian leader results? Finally, we examined the role of control mechanisms and institutional management in limiting management result. We tested our hypotheses through a questionnaire sent to the accounting of Tunis. We came to several conclusions. However, our study as any research represents some limitations. [...]
[...] In an attempt to understand why managers manipulate accounting results in this regard, Lapointe and Magnan (2002) point out that one of the main motivations for the management of the result is "maximizing the welfare officers. These include seeking to maximize the premiums calculated on the accounting profits. " Breton and Scott (2004) show that managers are encouraged to take advantage of opportunities provided under regulatory accounting in favor with shareholders. Regulatory incentives Three forms of regulatory incentives were discussed in the literature: earnings management as a means to circumvent the rules governing the business of the company, earnings management as a means to reduce the risk of investigation and of antitrust intervention services and finally the earnings management as a means to achieve a tax benefit plan. [...]
[...] IV- The motivations of capital markets The motivations of the capital markets have been largely addressed in the context of the theory of signals.The starting point of the signal theory states that the assumptions of classical micro-economic theory are unrealistic and in particular the assumption of market transparency.There is actually an asymmetric information and company managers have inside information and better quality than those available to the market in general.To prevent this from leading to a suboptimal equilibrium, leaders strive to pass on information to the market. [...]
[...] The capital structure is used as an indicator of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.Thus, the author assumes that the more open the society, the greater the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers.The agency stresses on all the more important structures.The assumption is this: Open businesses (respectively closed) should make accounting policy choices and this will help (respectively decrease) the author use the result as an indicator for the variable "share" the percentage of participation in the capital of the company held by the three largest shareholders.The result of his study shows that the "ownership" variable does not influence the choice of accounting policies used (choice of depreciation methods for fixed assets, stock assessments, depreciation method of Good-will ( line or declining balance) method of taking account of pension liabilities) - Studies addressing the impact of debt on the management of results Study results generally validate the assumption of debt and it is one of internal governance mechanisms, "the firm is more debt, and its leader tends to choose accounting methods that increase the published results." Watts (1977), using the results of Jensen and Meckling (1976), was the first to advance the argument that this factor influences the choice of accounting methods. [...]
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