Religion, Tom Kelly, Chicago Bulls
A cognitive peer, as defined by Tom Kelly refer to a person who posses all the intellectual virtues as the other peer. It also refers to the person who has been exposed to the same arguments as the other peer (Kelly, 2005; p.175). Kelly stated that the only question at issue is whether arguments with once known peers would inevitably undermine the rationality of justification of one's beliefs. This might require that if the arguments do not undermine the level of confidence in maintaining one's belief, then the level of confidence lowered must be compatible with rational maintaining of the belief. The rationality of the peers engaged in disagreement depends on the peer who has correctly evaluated evidence to his disagreement (Kelly, 2005; p.180).
People probably have had many acquaintances and possibly close friends having beliefs that significantly differ from their own. In some cases, the differences in beliefs can be commonplace, such that one's belief can be that LA Lakers are the best NBA team and a friend may belief that Dallas Mavericks or Chicago Bulls are the best NBA team. Despite the differences, friends will still manage to go along and remain friends.
[...] (Print) Translated by Marion Kuntz. Princeton: Princeton University press Clark, Kelly James. Return to Reason. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.Feldman, Richard. Reasonable Religious. Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Edited by Louise Antony. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press Pp. 194-214. Hetherington, Stephen Cade. [...]
[...] However; it is a rare occasion for both to be fully rational on the particular disagreement. In the philosophy, it is concluded that one of the epistemic peers is not fully rational as they do not have same evidences despite contrary appearances. Often, disagreements in philosophy have at least one epistemic peer not being fully rational and probably both the peers are misled by subtle equivocations, and that at least one of the epistemic peers is irrational on the occasion in his evidential assessment. [...]
[...] Consider when cognitive peers were both given an addition problem of which one has to sum up several five- digit numbers. One will pay close attention in solving the problem step by step and come up with a conclusion that his answer is correct. When comparing the answer to another peer, one realized that his peer has come to a different conclusion of which he is confident to be correct. This put one in a situation where he ins no longer justified believing that he has the right answer to the problem since his cognitive peer has reached a different conclusion one could easily arrive at. [...]
[...] Those adhering to another religion will affirm a contrary claim. When people disagree on fundamental beliefs in our day to day lives, the result is not always dispassionate. Because people are aware of the occurring practical consequences with disagreement on matters, this essay will direct an aspect of concern on how the rational status of belief is impacted by the nature of our disagreement. In particular, the essay presents an agreement to the statement that one's own knowing and that of one's cognitive peer results to reduced confidence in the reliability of one's own forming processes of belief, and consequently this leads to a reduction in confidence for one to justify his belief. [...]
[...] Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press Print. Kelly, Thomas. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Volume edited Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press Pp.167-196. Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. [...]
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