Religious freedom, Strasbourg jurisprudence, European Convention
Freedom of religion or, more broadly, of conviction, because it affects everyone in the depths of him, is abundant authority in the decisions of the Strasbourg court. Indeed, whether the problem of the manifestation of religion, especially in areas subject to public authority, or the problem of the recognition of this freedom to the various religious movements, such as sects, religious freedom remains a thorny problem often complex and must constantly be reconciled with conflicting principles. Freedom of religion, because it sometimes seems to contradict some fundamental European values, remains one of the freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights particularly difficult to implement.
Therefore, how the Strasbourg jurisprudence evolves face the influences of different conceptions of freedom of religion is essential.
[...] So, are the expression of a conviction: the pacifist ideas, those refusing all corporal punishment in schools or hunting. It takes more than religion is identifiable. As will be discussed later in this study, religious freedom implies the right to change it. However, as Mr. Gérard Gonzalez rightly wrote, " . the right to change religion is more widely analyzed as the right to choose his religion, support events which contribute to give effect to this possibility. This right can not be restricted to the internal forum. [...]
[...] The content of religious freedom and its limits Freedom of religion or, more broadly, of conviction, because it affects everyone in the depths of him, is abundant authority in the decisions of the Strasbourg court. Indeed, whether the problem of the manifestation of religion, especially in areas subject to public authority, or the problem of the recognition of this freedom to the various religious movements, such as sects, religious freedom remains a thorny problem often complex and must constantly be reconciled with conflicting principles. [...]
[...] By cons, it is prohibited for the State to "pursue an aim of indoctrination." He can seek "to influence children in a particular faith or belief." The obligation of the State will, however, appreciated more flexibly when it leaves parents an alternative to public education, by authorizing and subsidizing private schools, although the weight given to this account in the Kjeldsen remains uncertain . Note that these basic principles of Kjeldsen were restrictively interpreted in the subsequent case law of the Commission and the Court. For the question of religious education in public schools arose. In fact, a state that would mandate a religious instruction course without possibility of exemption would violate Article 2 of Protocol 1. [...]
[...] Parents of students involved to seize the Court and claims that this decision violates their religious beliefs as Christians. The authorities refused to exempt their children from this course, they consider themselves victims of a violation of their right under the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol provides 1. Although the Court rejected the request of parents, she recalled that they have the right to exempt their children from religious instruction denominational and that it will check whether the Danish authorities provide significant assistance to private schools. [...]
[...] But as the Commission pointed out to parents complaining about having to go to public schools because the state does not subsidize private schools, Article 2 does not require States to subsidize. This is clear from the judgment 40 mothers of 9 March 1977. However, Kjeldsen of 7 December 1976 states that in looking if there had been a violation of Article it will take account the fact that the authorities [ . ] provide substantial assistance to private schools, thereby providing parents an alternative. Then, this right implies control of curriculum content and a right "of the above parents. [...]
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