The question is, therefore, whether Rawls's egalitarianism is not enough egalitarian or too egalitarian. After having exposed the main points of Rawls's view of economic justice, the analysis of its major criticisms, both from the left and the right sides, is necessary to bring out the very meaning of Rawls's egalitarianism.
[...] The question is, therefore, whether Rawls's egalitarianism is not enough egalitarian or too egalitarian. After having exposed the main points of Rawls's view of economic justice, the analysis of its major criticisms, both from the left and the right sides, is necessary to bring out the very meaning of Rawls's egalitarianism. For J. Rawls, “democratic equality” refers to the particular way in which his second principle of justice, composed by the fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle, combined two distinct egalitarian issues. [...]
[...] As departure from equality is necessary only if and because talented individuals do not adjust their behaviour to the demands of the conception of justice”(G.A. Cohen, The Pareto argument for inequality), an “egalitarian ethos” of justice, that forbid purely self-serving motivations, should be introduce in Rawls's theory. Such an of justice should avoid situations in which egoistical individuals are free to demand incentives-generating inequalities, or in which the family scheme does not comply with the fair equality of opportunity of the females. The of justice should govern what for J. Rawls are private choices. [...]
[...] The principles of justice are not supposed to govern individual personal choices. Individuals are still free to pursue their own conception of good life. As J. Rawls puts it, in Political Liberalism, difference principle (do not) appl(y) to the decisions of individual , but rather to the institutional background against which those transactions and decisions take place”. J. Rawls draws a fundamental division of responsibilities between the private and the public spheres. The society must assure that all free and equal citizens have the means to develop their capabilities as citizens. [...]
[...] Since Rawls first principle is prior to his second, individual rights are not threatened by the pursuit of an egalitarian end. We can admit with Nozick that there is no presumption of equality, that in a free society distribution results from individual exchanges. As he declares: “Whether or not people's natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what flows from them” (An Entitlement Theory). But we can also appeal to the fair equality of opportunity and to the difference principle to specify the relevant processes which justify equality. [...]
[...] And finally it recognizes that procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of outcome Diversity of Objections to Inequality”). Rawls's egalitarianism, however, through his first principle of justice is not too strict so that he would not threatened the individuals rights. Sources: J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness”, in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds.), Social Justice T.M. Scanlon, Diversity of Objections to Inequality”, in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds.), Social Justice M. Clayton and A. Williams, “Some Questions for Egalitarians”, in The Ideal of Equality D. Parfit, “Equality or Priority in M. Clayton and [...]
Online readingwith our online reader
Content validatedby our reading committee