Dayton Peace agreement, Carlw Bildt, Sarjevo, Bosno-Serbs, Croats, Bosniak, Radovan Karadzic, VRS Vojska Republike Srpske, Bosnian Posavina, Croat-Bosniak war, Milosevic
The Dayton Peace agreement, initiated in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and signed in Paris a month later, put an end to the worst conflict Europe had known since the Second World War. After three years of diplomatic shortcomings and blocked negotiations, US envoy Richard Hoolbrooke - the Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European affairs - is tasked by his government to negotiate the end of hostilities.
[...] Conclusion But the bigger the objectives, the harder it is to put together a coherent, viable and enforceable deal. One of the first problems the Dayton agreement faces post-analysis is ‘the fact that the DPA had to accommodate both the strong forces of disintegration, and the ambitions for a democratic multiethnic state'. The difficulties posed by the interrelations between ethnic clashes, statehood and human rights, but also with the implementation, prosecution (with the TPY) have often been at the source of Dayton's critics. [...]
[...] The negotiations focused broadly on three points. The first one concerned in the city of Goražde, a Muslim enclave in East Bosnia and RS territory, isolated from the federation of the cease-fire lines. The federation wanted a corridor linking the town to their mainland in order to ensure its security. As depicted in the film ‘Yugoslavia: Suicide of a European nation', Milošević agreed to the Bosniak asking, and it was decided to put the road under NATO responsibility and international control. [...]
[...] Furthermore, parties agreed on human rights and migration-related issues. The second document produced for the settlement (‘Further agreed basic principles') advocated for the organisation of central Bosnian power, envisaging a shared presidency, a parliament and a constitutional court. The emphasis put on national institutions obviously aimed at smoothing further negotiation, but also at shutting down any rumours of a possible partition. The next step was to bring all parties to a ceasefire, in order to start the ‘real' negotiations; but if Milošević agreed to stop the fighting and had been advocating for the ceasefire for weeks, the other actors, and mainly A. [...]
[...] In 1995, the year of the Dayton agreement, we then have a politically fragile federation facing the VRS, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) charged to protect designed ‘safe areas' and ensure civilian safety and humanitarian support. Over the course of the year, the federation gradually takes advantage over the VRS, conducting multiple joint offensives (operations Summer, Mistral, Sana ) and reclaiming most of Western Bosnia. With such territorial loss, pressure from NATO bombings and Belgrade, the Bosno-Serbs lose all initiative in the conflict. But in order to reach a full understanding of the war situation, one must not only discuss the ground actors main positions, but also the different foreign interests at play. [...]
[...] The generalised indifference to the conflict during the Bush Sr. years - and the first Clinton ones were replaced by the global Dayton diplomatic offensive. It took 2 years for President Clinton to put peace in Bosnia - for which he had dramatically advocated during his campaign, at the centre of US preoccupations. One should then ask what changed in 1995 from Washington's point of view. As we have seen, the ground situation was turning to the advantage of the federation, which was formed under Western auspices; at the same time, crimes against civilians were escalating in Bosnia, increasing public pressure and taking away Richard K. [...]
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