The two nuclear powers of the Indian subcontinent, India and Pakistan have a serious dispute which dates back to the time of their independence from the British Empire in 1947. A difference of opinion at the time of independence led to the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of the predominantly Muslim nation, Pakistan, in accordance with the theory advanced by Mohammed Ali Jinnah's "two nation's theory." This led to the loss and displacement of several million lives the original trauma of which can never be forgotten. The two countries still continue to maintain a tense relationship perpetually putting at risk the stability of the region.
[...] Since the war in Afghanistan, the danger of Talibanization of the country raises the fear of the future relations between India and Pakistan. Section The American factor Before the attack Before the September 11th attack, Pakistan was a strategic ally of the U.S. because it was a buffer zone between the USSR, China and the Western world. The trials of 1998, with a clear update of effective nuclearization of the region, invited economic sanctions against the two countries by the U.S., which had also refused to sign the NPT and the CTBT in 1995 in 1996. [...]
[...] In addition to the special situation of Pakistan the two sides are likely to attract a particular risk of rapid transition to nuclear power in the event of a major conventional conflict. The rudimentary means of warning on both sides could lead to misinterpretations. Equity in the features of "deterrent South Asian Theater” We can say that the "deterrent South Asian Theater" presents the following characteristics: Two adjoining countries; An old border dispute, relating to the identity of the two countries; High or low intensity clashes over the past several decades; An appeal to the guerrillas-harassment and terrorism as a means of pressure; A cultural and historical community Nuclear capacity initially based on aviation, but evolving rapidly towards deterrents formed around ground to ground ballistic missiles; Asymmetry of conventional quantitative, partially offset by a reversed asymmetry qualitatively; An uncertain second strike capability, but the means of intelligence on both sides does not ensure the identification of all insured opposing ways; A relatively shallow theater suitable for the surprise attack, and no total strategic depth on one side of the theater; A lack of formal military alliances; The presence in the immediate vicinity of declared nuclear powers; A "learning" phase of deterrence during crises. [...]
[...] By carrying out the nuclear tests, Pakistan wanted to remain in the race and face the challenges posed by India The Islamic bomb The spread of mass destruction weapons in Muslim countries raised a question about the rising Islamic, modern version of the concept, especially popular during the previous decade, known as the "Islamic bomb." The fact that Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya are developing a more or less active program for weapons of mass destruction justifies the question. [...]
[...] After the 2002 crisis, the "next crisis" may be more dangerous as India has progressed in the establishment of a protected capacity (land and sea) second strike. The question that arises is what would happen if a conventional open war takes place between India and Pakistan. Given the narrowness of the Pakistani viewpoint, the threshold of nuclear decision could indeed arise fairly quickly to Islamabad. Pakistani officials are willing to refer to the question of the "survival” at the risk of "extinction" of the country as the nuclear threshold. [...]
[...] The LoC (Line of Control) is recognized both by Islamabad and New Delhi as one of those "red lines" which, if exceeded could cause conflict in a new dimension. The essential lesson that can be drawn from these four crises is the " stability-instability paradox (International relation theory), propounded by well known analysts of the Cold War, is well validated in South Asia. This theory argues that the risks of nuclear weapons sterilizes major conventional conflict, but does not prevent confrontations of low intensity and may even encourage them, because no two players can afford to climb to a level that would force the other to cross the nuclear threshold. [...]
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