According to Article 19 regarding the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, an individual must be able to know whose ideas he endorsed or not, without weighing stress on him or resulting in any penalty. He must be able to speak without any kind of hindrance, regardless of who tries to prevent this. Nevertheless, the freedom to do something does not mean to do it at the expense of others and thus end up becoming a creditor of their own freedom. Therefore, it cannot be abused unless it can be held accountable. Also, one's freedom ends where another's begins: it is a principle of reconciliation. In other words, how does a judge organize the liberties between them to ensure their equitable coexistence that is necessary in a democratic society?"
According to the ECHR in its decision of 7 November 2006 an applicant is expressed in its capacity as elected and words are the expression of political or "activist" and it falls under the protection reinforced by the right to freedom of expression established in the light of Article 10 of the ECHR.
Therefore, the context of electoral competition is sufficient to justify the enhanced protection for the person about to restrict the discretion of the authorities on the need for a ban. In this regard, the ECHR in its decision of November 22, 2007 refers to the notion of electoral context to reject the hypothesis of defamation, "thereby limiting these remarks to the sole purpose of defamation particular and would negate the electoral context in which they were held.
Tags: European Convention on Human Rights,electoral competition
[...] It appears that the Court seeks to examine the effectiveness for violation of freedom of expression than other areas and that; ultimately, it seems to exclude such cases. Finally, concerning the dignity of a person, the Council of State considers that a legal ban cannot be effected on publicity as long as the allegation holds valid (December doc.99). The actual limits Freedom of expression, although fundamental, is not an absolute freedom. Chapters IV and V of the Act of 29 July 1881 (doc. [...]
[...] It should be noted that this law introduces a limit to freedom of expression has been criticized principally to look at it as an obstacle to historical research in that it would lead to an official truth. In this regard, Gilles Karmasyn believes that this law punishes, it is the discourse of denial rehabilitation of antisemitism as speech and incitement to hatred in it, and it does not participate in the development of a fixed reality that prevents historical research. Limit it is therefore the expression. Pursuant to this law, the ECHR ruled on the nature of the revisionist work of an applicant in the case of Garaudy 24 June 2003 (doc. [...]
[...] Freedom of Expression allows man to be a relational being, but "not to hold opinions" and "seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media of his choice and regardless of boundaries" within the meaning of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to that of Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). As such, an individual must be able to know that he can convey ideas without stress weighing on him of any penalty and must be able to speak without any obstacle of any kind or that prevents it. However, the freedom to do something does not mean to do it at the expense of another, the master himself of his own freedom. It cannot therefore be misused. Freedom stops where the other's begins, it is a principle of reconciliation. [...]
[...] 103) refers to the notion of electoral context to reject the hypothesis of defamation but “limits this to the sole purpose of defaming a particular person would negate the electoral context in which he was held”. And this is conducive to the public. Moreover, the decision of 22 October 2007 (doc. 104) pushes the tenor by expanding its scope in terms of the same person who disputes with the truth or contradicts the truth. The court states that "the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to a politician such as Mr. Le Pen and the Front National. This is particularly so in the case of Mr. [...]
[...] The decision of 22 November 2007 (doc. 103) clarifies this position by stating that a conviction "amounting to an interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of expression" and that "such interference violates Article 10 of the Convention unless it is required by law, directs at one or more of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 10 and necessary in a democratic society of limited freedom of expression”. The criteria established has invariably been taken into consideration for other decisions such as that of 22 October 2007 (doc. [...]
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