The 5th of December 2001, the Bonn agreement was the first text attempting to build a basis for a new start of the Afghan nation after the American invasion. It was set by international actors as different as the UN, who supervised the conference, the US, the EU, Saudi Arabia and the World Bank. The preamble sets out the overriding goals of the transition process, it should build Afghanistan as a society with a fully representative government in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice. As ideal guides for the transition process, these goals have no timetable for implementation. The second and main part of the agreement is a precise outline of structures and processes to be realized within two and a half years. This is a strategy of action and is described as a step towards the ultimate goals. To understand these goals, it should be taken into account the very specific history of Afghanistan. This country had to undergo more than twenty years of war and conflicts situations. Starting from 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan took control of Afghanistan thanks to a military coup. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as its first President and Prime Minister.
[...] The central government that the Bonn Agreement wanted to establish has never been strong enough. Warlords constitute a major threat for security because they recognize no other authority than theirs. The rule of gun prevails. They are terrorizing the population to prove their strength and legitimate their status of local chiefs. By intimidating the proponents of the “loya jirga”, the traditional grand council, they can keep the control of their region. In the Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, we can read very interesting testimonies such as the one of “loya jirga” commission observers for a local election: “There was a leader named Wakil Dost Mohammad Khan, who was an elder, not a military commander. [...]
[...] After the end of the war, they were considered as winners, so they had the possibility to participate in large scale to the Bonn process, whereas no member of the former taliban administration was invited in Bonn. It appears that the members of the conference wanted to change the balance for Afghanistan not to be Pashtun state” anymore. In fact, there was also a widespread idea among the international community that Pashtun representatives would be more easily sensitive to pressures coming from the Pakistani Pashtun community. [...]
[...] Thus, the purpose of this part is to show how the state that is being built in Afghanistan, on the bases of the Bonn Agreement needs to find itself legitimacy for implementing itself on the whole territory. The major obstacles to this are the problem of the ethnic heterogeneity of the afghan population. It risks creating permanent non-satisfaction among the citizens. Then, the warlords are now competing the state competition in exercising their power with a new form of legitimacy. [...]
[...] So the opium economy is definitely a major threat for the goals of the Bonn Agreement because it keeps the country into a vicious circle of warlordism, insecurity and weak state. In the past two decades, there has been a rapid growth of the opium economy because it appeared to be really attractive for farmers: poppy occurred to be a durable commodity commanding high prices, having guaranteed market and non-perishable. It benefits strong comparative advantages. Moreover, some other factors worked for the development of the opium economy in Afghanistan. [...]
[...] The purpose of this part is to describe the success and obstacles that have faced the Bonn Agreement in that state building perspective. Then to evaluate if this text was realistic and which things has been, or need to be done forward the text An extremely hard political context to build a democratic state First of all, it has to be admitted that the purpose to establish a new democratic central state in Afghanistan can seem unrealistic according to the Afghan states history. [...]
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