In early 1949, China was a nationalist country, ruled by Chiang Kai-shek and sustained by the United States. At the same time, the Chinese Communists were rebelling and ruling large parts of the country, and were constantly progressing. It was obvious that they were soon going to rule the country. As a result, the United States had to rethink its policy toward the Communists and the new regime. The victory of Chinese Communists over the Nationalists and the proclamation of the Republic of China in October 1949 shattered the vision the United States and its Western allies had had for post-war Asia. A Communist China in close proximity to US-occupied Japan, South Korea, newly independent India, the Philippines and war-torn French Indochina made the spread of communism into Asia seems to be another step in the USSR's post-war expansion like in Eastern Europe.
[...] 11) The refusal of the United States to recognize the PRC was an obstacle to diplomatic relations between the two countries and did not permit them to find any accommodation. By early 1950, the PRC wanted that the United States recognized them, as twenty-four nations had already done. This constant refusal of the United States to recognize the PRC was very unpopular not only in China but outside as well. But the United States linked this recognition with American diplomats and citizens' well- treatment. [...]
[...] Nevertheless public and Congressional opposition to an accommodation with the Communists aborted the most if his attempts of finding an accommodation. (Cohen p32-49) Attempts had been made to end the support of the Nationalist Chinese. For example, in August 1949 the White Paper declared that the Americans would stop additional involvement in China and not support the Nationalist Chinese anymore. This showed the willingness of opening the door to negotiations with the Chinese Communist leaders on the issue of recognition and, maybe, to remedy to the Mukden hostage situation (Grasso p80- 82). [...]
[...] policy toward the Nationalists and Taiwan was the main source of conflict between China and the United States. Since World War II, Washington supported the Nationalists, what profoundly irritated the CCP. Indeed, it made the Chinese Civil War last longer, raised its costs and put obstacles to the efforts of consolidation and reconstruction (Hunt p. 188). Moreover, long before Chiang's move to Taiwan, the United States administration considered this island as a very strategic region. As a result they were prepared to use possible political and economic means” to keep Taiwan of the hands of the Chinese Communists” to protect their harbours and military bases there (Grasso p. [...]
[...] No chance of an accommodation was possible in a bipolar world Two ideologies completely opposed With the discourse of Truman (Truman, March 12th, 1947) established in 1947 and the development of the strategy of containment by Kennan, the United States officially declared its hostility toward communism. From that point, they would check the expansionist project of the Soviet Union through economic, military, diplomatic, and political means. The strategy of containment claimed that no further efforts would be made to hide disagreements with the Soviet Union and its allies; rather, these would be expressed openly, but in a non provocative manner. [...]
[...] Even if, in November 1948, the PRC followed the Cominform's condemnation of Tito, and acknowledged the leading role of the USSR in the socialist camp, some people in the Chinese Communist party wanted a more equidistant posture between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus they would not only depend on the Soviet Union economic and military support. (Hunt p. 209-12) At the same time, in Washington, the National Security Council (NSC) proposed to apply a strategy, which would provoke a schism between China and the USSR, the NSC 41 strategy. [...]
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