It is part of the general pattern of misguided policy that our country is now geared to an arms economy which was bred in an artificially induced psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon an incessant propaganda of fear proclaimed General Douglas MacArthur on May 15, 1951 in a statement which echoes the politics induced by American involvement in the Korean War. The conflict was bred in the Cold War environment of the unknown and faced with one clear enemy ideology, but lacking a clear definition of enemy nations. Korea played a definitive role in shaping the course of American foreign policy for the second half of the twentieth century. A new kind of war was birthed, wherein America desired to clearly define the terms of her involvement in a different kind of combat of limited warfare. Henceforth the nation proposed to participate only if the benefits could be clearly aligned alongside American policy.
[...] The Korean War can most generally be defined within the terms of the Cold War; its policies were shaped by and stemmed from Cold War fears, which only led to involvement in Korea defining the shape of American foreign involvement. Korea also cannot be separated from the social climate spawned by the Cold War and prevalence of McCarthyism. In response, President Eisenhower characterized America's growing identity as one of military- industrial establishment” which supported American-dominated power bloc” responsible for warding against and inspired by halting the spread of a communist power bloc. [...]
[...] The containment policy was not completely drawn up by Truman and his advisors; it was engrained within the minds of the American people following the Second World War. In the same sense, Americans had only sanctioned a limited war and had yet to demand a full scale victorious result. As late as June of 1952, Presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower said of the conflict, do not have any prescription for bringing the thing to a decisive because no definitive end was demanded by the voters. [...]
[...] Eisenhower can be seen historically as the man elected to end the Korean War, which he and although victory may remain debated, he opened the debate for a new concept of American foreign policy with the purpose of benefiting American interests. If nothing else, Korea resulted in a clear shift of American mentality. The most difficult task was seemingly adjusting the mindset of the public to accept less than total victory. By the mid 1950's an extended war could not be sold to Americans, but “Korea was already being upstaged by the problem of Indochina, and the United States was barely out of one Asian bog before it embarked on the path leading to another, deeper one”. [...]
[...] Symbolically these policy propositions personify America's collective drive of the twentieth century towards sole power, not just a leading world power. Vice President Richard Nixon supported the policy's redesign. In 1954 he ensured that it was not reliant on atomic weapons (as many had feared total victory would only be possible by an assault of a nuclear arsenal), and that it was developed as a response against containment. Nixon, who played a vital advisory role, said the administration's strategy was designed to be implemented successfully to govern relations not only in Asia but also in Europe and when dealing with Soviet Satellites. [...]
[...] The Wrong War American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. Ithaca: Cornell University Press Gabriel, Jurg, Martin. The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941. London: MacMillan Press Heller, Frances, ed. The Korean War, a 25 year Perspective. The Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas Rothkopf, David, J. Running the World, The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs Sellers, Charles, Ross, Hugh, eds. [...]
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